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Introduction 
This article will reflect on a smaller scale institutional response to the Tōhoku earthquake: that 
of the University of Sheffield. It is hoped that an account of the actions taken by the University 
may prove instructive for scholars studying the processes of crisis management undertaken by 
academic institutions, as well as for planning by institutions and organisations with personnel 
overseas, such as corporations and NGOs. It will consider Sheffield’s response in three stages: 
the first, from 11-15 March was run from within the School of East Asian Studies (SEAS) and 
focussed on immediate contact with students; between 16 March-10 April when response was 
managed and overseen by the university’s Incident Management Team (IMT) in two phases: 
from 15-22 March focussed on supporting students with immediate offers of relocation; and 
from 23 March-10 April when most of the administration was devolved back to SEAS to 
consider the details of alternative provision, with the IMT providing oversight and support. 
 
Background: The University of Sheffield 
Sheffield is a major UK centre for Japanese Studies and runs one of the larger Japanese 
programmes in the country, with a compulsory Year Abroad in Japan taking place in students’ 
third year of study. Students generally arrive in Japan in September, and return to the UK the 
following August. While there, they are widely dispersed between Sheffield’s exchange partner 
universities, of which eleven are in the Tokyo area,1 with an additional seventeen elsewhere in 
Japan.2 This poses administrative challenges under normal circumstances; it also made dealing 
with the aftermath of the earthquake more complex as different students had a range of 
needs depending upon their locations. 
In March 2011 I was sole Japan Year Abroad Coordinator in SEAS, with responsibility for 
overseeing the administration of the Year Abroad. Fortunately, prior to that point students had 
experienced only the types of issues which are to be: concerns over progress, homesickness, 
and occasional financial issues, for example; all of which could be dealt with by reassurance, or 
discussions with the partner university in question. The Tōhoku earthquake, therefore, was the 
first time in departmental memory that we had had a significant number of students caught up 
                                                             
1 There were only ten Tokyo-based exchange universities in 2011, as an exchange agreement with the 
University of Tokyo was not finalised until 2013. 
2 See http://www.sheffield.ac.uk/seas/undergraduates/courses/jstudy for a complete list. 
in a natural disaster simultaneously. The rapidly changing situation on the ground necessitated 
prompt decision-making, and liaison between the department, which had direct contact with 
the students, and the ability to monitor the news from Japanese sources, and the university’s 
central administration, who had to set policy and take the actual decisions. The nature of this 
process, and how the university’s response developed, can best be illustrated by a 
chronological account of the month following 11 March 2011. 
 
Phase One Response: Contact with Students 
I awoke on 11 March 2011 to news of the earthquake and tsunami which had struck Japan 
several hours earlier. SEAS had twenty-nine undergraduate students on exchange that year3 
and, while there were none in the Tōhoku region and thus likely to have been directly 
endangered, given the reports of the extent of the damage, I was concerned to ensure that we 
knew they were all safe and well. This was also a concern for students’ families – by about 
08:30, the department had already had its first call from a concerned parent. Our priority was, 
therefore, to get in contact with both students and partner universities as quickly as possible, 
and to provide reassurance and contact information for students’ families. This resulted in all 
students being emailed at 09:27, asking them to confirm that they were safe and well. A report 
on our current knowledge of the situation, and a contact telephone number was uploaded to 
the departmental homepage by 10:00. Regular updates to this information were made 
throughout the day, with the departmental contact number being replaced by that of the 
university when the departmental office closed for the weekend. 
The response from the students was good, and evidence that even in the aftermath of such a 
severe event, Japan’s communications infrastructure was relatively undisturbed: 23 students 
had contacted us by the early evening of 11 March; information on a further two was received 
directly from their host universities, and a further three contacted us on 12 March. This left 
only one student unaccounted for, but one of his classmates contacted us over the weekend 
and reported that the student ‘had been seen out at a party’ the day before, and so was 
obviously well. By 13 March, therefore, we knew that all our students were unharmed, and not 
in any immediate danger. The timing of the earthquake was fortuitous, in that it took place in 
the spring break between Japanese academic semesters. This meant that a number of 
students who were placed in Tokyo, and who might have been most directly affected, had 
returned to the UK to visit family, while others were travelling elsewhere. This reduced the 
number about whom we had to have immediate concerns. 
Simultaneously, however, with reports in the British media about food shortages and power 
outages in Tokyo, as well as the deteriorating and unpredictable situation at the nuclear power 
plant in Fukushima, by Monday, 14 March, the university had fielded several calls from 
parents, asking for advice about whether their children should make urgent arrangements to 
return home. It was at this point that the university’s central administration became directly 
involved, with discussions between myself and the Head of International Student Support 
about what the best advice to give would be, as well as what measures the university should 
                                                             
3 There were an additional three undergraduates from the Chemistry department, on a separate 
exchange programme at Okayama University. 
be putting in place to aid Japanese students in Sheffield, who would naturally be concerned 
about friends and family back home. This was also when the department began to receive 
requests from the media for comment about the situation and staff members were 
interviewed for news reports. 
The advice we provided on 14 March was that there was no immediate need for students to 
consider returning to the UK, or leaving Tokyo – this was in line with the Foreign Office advice 
at the time. However, with the situation at Fukushima still apparently deteriorating on 15 
March, the university took the decision to activate its emergency procedures and establish an 
Incident Management Team (IMT). This group drew together people from academic and 
administrative departments in order that decisions and actions could be taken quickly, and the 
university’s senior management be kept informed. 
 
Phase Two Response: Fukushima and Relocation within Japan 
The IMT was chaired by the university’s Head of Student Services, and had the following 
membership and functions: 
Section Role 
Student Services – Taught Programmes Consider the impact on students’ studies, 
and any necessary regulatory changes 
Student Services – International Office Oversight of the relationship between 
Sheffield and its partner universities 
Student Services – International Support Organise support for Japanese students in 
Sheffield, and contacts between the 
university and students’ families 
Student Services – Financial Support Consider budgeting and financial provisions 
for any decisions taken by the IMT 
Union of Students Act as a channel of communication with the 
general student body 
Accommodations Office Consider arrangements for emergency 
accommodation provision, should students 
evacuate from Japan 
School of East Asian Studies Provide expert knowledge about the 
situation in Japan; act as channel of 
communication directly with affected 
students 
Chemistry Act as channel of communication directly 
with affected students 
English Language Teaching Centre Act as channel of communication with 
Japanese Student presently in Sheffield 
Media Relations Coordinate the university’s public 
statements about its response 
Corporate Communications Coordinate the university’s reports on its 
actions to staff and students 
Security Services Monitor, respond and report on any 
potential security risks to the university – 
this was mainly a concern at the possibility 
of environmental demonstrations at the 
university’s nuclear research facilities. 
 
The IMT first convened in the early afternoon of 16 March. Prior to that, SEAS members met to 
discuss whether any of the lessons learned from the SARS outbreak in 2002-03, and which had 
impacted on students studying in China, were applicable to the situation. The general 
consensus was that the situations were significantly different, although there might be 
benefits from coordination with other UK-based academic institutions, should a significant 
number of students return to the UK. 
At the first meeting of the IMT, our best judgement on the information available was that 
students were safest remaining where they were, until there was a change in the FCO advice. 
Decisions were taken to begin contingency planning, to set up a dedicated IMT mailing list and 
online space, and share personal and mobile telephone numbers. All of this was intended to 
allow communication to be made quickly between IMT members, and any decisions taken 
outside of formal meetings to be conveyed quickly. This was required that evening, because 
the FCO advice changed to advise British nationals to ‘consider leaving Tokyo’; students were 
informed of this via email, and further steps considered at the next IMT meeting. 
It was at this meeting at 12:00 noon on 17 March that, in the light of the FCO advice, the 
decision was taken to offer all students in eastern Japan the opportunity to relocate 
temporarily to Kyoto until the situation in Tokyo became more stable, and/or to return to the 
UK via commercial flight. The Vice-Chancellor confirmed that the costs of this would be met 
from central university funds in the first instance. We were fortunate in that a member of SEAS 
academic staff, Dr Peter Matanle, was already in Kyoto as head of the Sheffield Dōshisha 
Centre, and was able to assist with this, but it was decided that I should fly to Japan as quickly 
as possible to coordinate events there. Simultaneously, all students’ In Case of Emergency (ICE) 
contacts were telephoned by staff from student services to keep them informed, and offer 
further support. Information was also placed on the university homepage, with links for 
contacts with the university’s critical support team. Other sections of the university also 
stepped up their contingency planning for student returns, and a briefing was prepared for the 
University Executive Board. 
By the time of the next IMT meeting, at 08:30 the following morning, I was about to board my 
flight to Japan, and the university’s response shifted into another phase, with Peter and myself 
dealing with the students’ immediate situations in Japan, and the IMT membership dealing 
with issues in the UK. The main developments on 18 March were: taking steps to provide 
necessary emotional support to Japanese students in Sheffield via the Chaplaincy Service; 
coordinating with the student union which was planning fundraising activities for the 
earthquake’s victims; requesting SEAS to consider alternative provision options for students 
returning from Japan and unable to go back; financial planning, as well as considering whether 
the university’s costs could be recouped from its insurers; and drafting a media policy and 
statement. The key concerns at this stage, however, were still the provision of immediate 
support to students. 
I arrived at Osaka’s Kansai International Airport on 19 March. By this time, only one of the 
students in Tokyo had decided to relocate to Kyoto, one of the Chemistry students had 
telephoned from Okayama seeking reassurance, and a further student had returned to the UK 
independently. That day I made telephone contact with all the students in Japan, enquired 
about their situation, and reiterated the university’s offer of support. All of them felt 
unworried about their personal safety and were more concerned reassuring families back in 
the UK, given the sensationalist tone of much of the British media coverage. 
Late on 19 March the British embassy began the distribution of iodine to British nationals. The 
following morning, the one student who had come from Tokyo to Kyoto decided to return 
home, and I made the arrangements. All of the others reiterated their determination to remain 
in Japan – one was even looking forward to her family coming for a visit. Simultaneously, one 
of the Chemistry students came to Kyoto for an overnight stay, as many of her friends from 
other countries had promptly returned home. 
The inconsistency of national and institutional policies was to become an issue the following 
day, when we had the first queries from students about why all of their American or German 
friends had left. The solution was to explain that there were different legal frameworks, as well 
as varying government advice, but that as a UK institution, Sheffield would be guided by the 
FCO. In order to provide emotional and psychological support to students, arrangements were 
made for email and/or telephone contact with the university’s counselling service. 
The IMT decided that day to make one further call to students’ ICE contacts to make clear 
what support the university was able to provide, but that there would be no further emails to 
students, as the feeling was that as much as could possibly be done had been done. From 
immediate crisis management, therefore, the focus shifted to dealing with the contingencies 
of student return, and what needed to be done to maintain provision should anyone not go 
back to Japan. 
 
Phase Three Response: Alternative Provision 
Over the next few days, the situation in Japan began to normalise, and partner universities 
began to make announcements about their arrangements for commencing their spring 
semesters. Nevertheless, the fifteen students at universities in the Tokyo area were offered 
the choice between remaining where they were, relocating to an alternative university in the 
west of Japan, or returning for alternative provision in the UK. Most promptly indicated that 
they would return to their current universities, and by 28 March there were only two students 
undecided. This necessitated discussions over the best form for alternative provision, with an 
intensive diploma course being run at SOAS seeming like the best option. This involved 
discussions and budgeting for exceptional accommodation arrangements. 
By 6 April, however, there remained only one student who had returned to the UK and not 
gone back to Japan, largely as a result of parental pressure. Once the FCO guidance was 
revised to indicate that there were no obstacles to travel to Tokyo, the student overcame 
these objections, and indicated on 10 April that he would return to Japan. At this point the IMT 
was officially stood down, and there was a brief exercise to consider the lessons learnt from 
crisis. 
 
Conclusion 
From the outset, the university saw its role as offering students advice and support – whether 
emotional, informational, or financial – but that it was students’ own responsibility to take 
decisions, and that it did not have the ability or authority to instruct students to take any 
particular course of action. This position was at variance with that adopted by some UK, and 
other, universities, but reflected the university’s concern to treat its students as adults. 
On an institutional level, the earthquake, and the experience of it, stimulated further 
developments. Departmentally, it led to the drawing up of an emergency plan for dealing with 
future crises. By their very nature, these tend to be unique and require ad hoc responses, so 
rather than focus on details, the emphasis was on outlining a process to be followed, roles for 
individual office holders such as Year Abroad Coordinators, Head of Department, departmental 
web-manager and so forth. The plan is predicated on the assumption that a serious crisis 
would result in the formation of an IMT, which would take the essential decisions, but also lays 
out the necessary communication routes between the department and central administration 
prior to this happening. Fortunately, in the years since 2011, the plan has only had to be 
activated once, during a brief period of heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula, and was 
swiftly stood down again as the situation improved, although elements of it were utilised 
during the MERS outbreak in South Korea in 2015. Neither of these situations required an IMT, 
however. 
In the months following the earthquake, Student Services also established a group bringing 
together staff from a range of central and academic departments to consider what to do in a 
range of crisis scenarios and refine the university’s responses. SEAS took part in this group to 
provide advice on the practicalities of different actions, based on our experience of dealing 
with Tōhoku. The scenarios ranged from natural disasters to more man-made ones, such as 
students being caught up in armed conflict, or victims of a major terrorist incident. A key 
conclusion of this exercise was the need for clarity of communication between the centre and 
departments, and making sure that both individual members of staff and students knew who 
to contact, and how, in case they needed critical support. This, in turn, led to refinements in 
documentation, and to the briefings delivered to students prior to their going on Year Abroad 
placements. This is something which is now kept actively under review, with centrally agreed 
information contained in all Year Abroad briefings. 
The Tōhoku earthquake was an unprecedented event, and posed a significant challenge to the 
university’s personnel and processes. There is no doubt that we were fortunate to be spared 
the worst outcome of students being injured, or killed; and, in the end, did not have to make 
alternative provision to enable students to continue their studies outside of Japan. 
Nevertheless, the university’s response, which was composed of the actions and decisions of a 
large number of individual members of staff, was characterised by professionalism, and a focus 
on ensuring first the students’ physical wellbeing and security, second, their emotional and 
psychological security, and finally, safeguarding their educational opportunities, and I am 
confident that any future crisis will be approached in the same manner and with the same 
priorities. 
